As a new type of epistemic logics, the logics of knowing how capture the high-level epistemic reasoning about the knowledge of various plans to achieve certain goals. Existing work on these logics focuses on axiomatizations; this paper makes the first study of their model theoretical properties. It does so by introducing suitable notions of bisimulation for a family of five knowing how logics based on different notions of plans. As an application, we study and compare the expressive power of these (...) logics. (shrink)

"The Concept of Number", by Ernst Cassirer, is the second chapter of his first systematic work, the "Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik", originally published in German in 1910. The translation to English, in 1953, by Marie Collins Swabeyand William Curtis Swabey, under the title "Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity", despite its importance for having widely disseminated the work, loses in its title the work's essence: the opposition between "concept-substance" and "concept-function", or rather, between (...) "substantial-concept" and "functional-concept". Cassirer possesses along with a "theory of symbolical forms" a "theory of culture". These theories are "theories of conceptual formation" and they are in charge of various case studies developed by Cassirer in “Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff”. Chapter 2, now translated, is a reading of the historical development of the concept of number under the view of a general theory of the concept that he presents in the second chapter of the book “Zur Theorie der Begriffsbildung” (On the theory of the conceptual formation). (shrink)

We investigate dynamic operations acting over a knowing how logic. Our approach makes use of a recently introduced semantics for the knowing how operator, based on an indistinguishability relation between plans. This semantics is arguably closer to the standard presentation of knowing that modalities in classic epistemic logic. Here, we discuss how the semantics enables us to define dynamic modalities representing different ways in which an agent can learn how to achieve a goal. In this regard, we study two types (...) of updates: ontic updates (for which we provide axiomatizations over a particular class of models), and epistemic updates (for which we investigate some semantic properties). (shrink)

En este artículo, analizamos el modo en que se articulan distintas representaciones sobre la Causa Malvinas, la guerra de 1982 y la posguerra en las letras de las canciones de rock nacional, en tanto expresiones de la cultura popular que fijan sentidos y que pueden manifestar ideas coincidentes con las dominantes o, por el contrario, visiones que las cuestionen y pongan en juego su hegemonía. Para ello, tomando al conflicto bélico de 1982 como punto de inflexión, hemos relevado un corpus (...) de veintisiete canciones que explícitamente refieren a la Guerra de Malvinas y sus implicancias, y que han contribuido a articular distintas perspectivas acerca de esta cuestión en el imaginario social. (shrink)

The gene regulation function (GRF) provides an operational description of a promoter behavior as a function of the concentration of one of its transcriptional regulators. Behind this apparently trivial definition lies a central concept in biological control: the GRF provides the input/output relationship of each edge in a transcriptional network, independently from the molecular interactions involved. Here we discuss how existing methods allow direct measurement of the GRF, and how several trade‐offs between scalability and accuracy have hindered its application to (...) relatively large networks. We discuss the theoretical and technical requirements for obtaining the GRF. Based on these requirements, we introduce a simplified and easily scalable method that is able to capture the significant parameters of the GRF. The GRF is able to predict the behavior of a simple genetic circuit, illustrating how addressing the quantitative nature of gene regulation substantially increases our comprehension on the mechanisms of gene control. (shrink)

This paper shows the brain correlates of Cloninger’s personality model during the presentation of social scenarios under positive or negative valence situations. Social scenarios were constructed when participants played the Dictator game with two confederates that had two opposites roles as the cooperator and non-cooperator. Later the same day during a fMRI scanning session, participants read negative and positive situations that happened to confederates in the past. Participants were asked to think “how do you think those people felt during that (...) situation?” A dissimilarity matrix between stimuli were obtained from fMRI results. Results shown that Harm Avoidance trait people make use of right middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop. Cooperation as a trait makes use of the right superior temporal gyrus and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in positive social scenarios. Finally, Self-directedness trait people make use of the right inferior parietal lobe to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in negative social scenarios and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and Strangers. An intuitive link between discrimination findings and behavioral patterns of those personality traits is proposed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

El hombre mediocre está integrado por las lecciones sobre psicología del carácter que dio José Ingenieros en la cátedra de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de Buenos Aires, durante el año 1910. En ellas se proponía comprender cómo funcionan las sociedades humanas. Para ello establecía y describía tres tipos o caracteres que según él era posible reconocer en cualquier comunidad de seres humanos: el idealista, el hombre mediocre y el inferior. Ingenieros no ocultaba su admiración hacia el primer tipo (...) pero, más allá de los juicios morales. Hizo el esfuerzo de entender en clave psicológica las particularidades de cada tipo y su función específica en nuestras sociedades. Así, dedicaba una parte importante de El hombre mediocre al segundo tipo, porque él constituye el grueso de las sociedades: «¿La continuidad de la vida social sería posible sin esa compacta masa de hombres puramente imitativos, capaces de conservar los hábitos rutinarios que la sociedad les transfunde mediante la educación? El mediocre no inventa nada, no crea, no empuja, no rompe, no engendra; pero, en cambio, custodia celosamente la armazón de automatismos y prejuicios y dogmas acumulados durante siglos, defendiendo ese capital común contra la asechanza de los inadaptables. Su rencor a los creadores compénsase por su resistencia a los destructores.». (shrink)

In Dark City, people live in a city that is constantly in the dark. The city is in fact a laboratory constructed by a race of Strangers who live below the urban surface to do experiments aimed at discovering what makes human beings human. The Strangers will survive only by becoming like them. To find out what humanity is, but assuming it is essentially related to memory, every day they paralyze all human activity, extract memories from individuals, mix them, and (...) inject them back. When people wake up, they are totally different persons – but do not know it. This article examines how, starting with such a situation, Dark City explores the role of memory in personhood, the problem of authenticity, and the status of “false” memories in making the self, and how the connect to the experimental psychology and the neuroscience of memory. (shrink)

Although the eighteenth century is not a chief interest of historians of psychology, nor is the history of psychology a main topic of Enlightenment studies, the era has long qualified as what a textbook of modern philosophy called "the century of psychology". The present article examines such a historiographical paradox, and asks in what senses eighteenth-century might deserve that label. For the general historian of the Enlightenment, as for historians of logic, esthetics, moral philosophy, or education, the label is justified (...) by the psychologization experienced by those domains and others. The historian of the human sciences can agree because, especially in Germany, empirical psychology became during the eighteenth century an autonomous field of academic investigation. Psychology, under that name or otherwise, gained throughout Europe the highest rank in the hierarchy of the sciences. Moreover, insofar as its object was the soul united to, and interacting with the body, and to the extent that human beings were defined precisely by such a union and "commerce", psychology became the crucial anthropological science, on which all other branches of the "science of man" were said to depend. Finally, the development during the Aufklärung of a historical discourse about empirical psychology reveals the self-consciousness attained within the emerging field by the end of the eighteenth century. Weder ist das achtzehnte Jahrhundert für die Geschichte der Psychologie ein Schwerpunkt der Forschung, noch ist die Geschichte der Psychologie ein Hauptthema der Arbeiten über die Aufklärung. Trotzdem wurde diese Ära doch lange Zeit als das qualifiziert, was ein Textbuch der modernen Philosophie als "das Jahrhundert der Psychologie" bezeichnet. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht dieses historiographische Paradoxon, und fragt, inwiefern das achtzehnte Jahrhundert die Bezeichnung "Jahrhundert der Psychologie" verdient.Für den "allgemeinen" Historiker der Aufklärung genauso wie für die Historiker der Logik, der Ästhetik, der Moralphilosophie oder der Erziehung rechtfertigt sich die Bezeichnung aus der Psychologisierung, die diese und andere Gebiete erfahren haben. Der Historiker, der sich mit den Geisteswissenschaften beschäftigt, kann ihr ebenfalls zustimmen, da die empirische Psychologie, insbesondere in Deutschland, während des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts ein eigenständiges Feld auf dem Gebiet der akademischen Forschung wurde.Die Psychologie, sei es nun unter diesem oder einem anderen Namen, erreichte in der Hierarchie der Wissenschaften in ganz Europa den höchsten Rang. Darüber hinaus wurde sie zu einer kritischen anthropologischen Wissenschaft, von der gesagt wurde, daß alle anderen "Humanwissenschaften" auf ihr beruhen. Denn ihr Gegenstand war die mit dem Körper eine Einheit bildende und mit ihm zusammen agierende Seele, und in dem Umfang, in dem die Menschen präzise durch diese Einheit und durch das "commercium" beschrieben wurden. Letztendlich spiegelt die Entwicklung eines historischen Diskurses über die empirische Psychologie während der Aufklärung das Selbstbewußtsein wieder, das innerhalb dieses aufstrebenden Bereichs gegen Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts erlangt wurde. (shrink)

Entrevista a Miguel Valderrama por Raúl Rodríguez Freire.

In this paper, I argue that Miki’s concept of myth offers a continuation and consolidation of his Philosophy of History, providing an important conceptual tool to comprehend his philosophica...

L’action est morale si elle est voulue en toute circonstance. Selon la Typique de la faculté de juger pratique, la loi fournit le modèle pour le passage à l’universel. Si ce modèle convient à la première formule del’impératif catégorique, il ne suffit à fonder ni la seconde, ni la troisième. On met en lumière les apories de la pensée kantienne pour indiquer ensuite que la position du problème de la « justice » par Rawls apporte peut-être un principe de solution.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tetsugaku Companion to Nishida Kitarō ed. by Matsumaru Hisao, Arisaka Yoko, and Lucy Christine SchultzFernando Wirtz (bio)Tetsugaku Companion to Nishida Kitarō. Edited by Matsumaru Hisao, Arisaka Yoko, and Lucy Christine Schultz. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2022. Pp. v + 240. Hardcover $109.99, isbn 978–3-319417-83-7.This collection of essays has several virtues. First, although Nishida is one of the most widely translated Japanese philosophers into English, this is the first collection (...) of interpretative essays that attempts to cover the different aspects and stages of his work in a comprehensive manner.Second, this collection gives voice to several Japanese scholars who have long been working on Nishida's philosophy, but who are nevertheless little known outside Japan. Of course, as the editors explain in the introduction, the book intentionally seeks to incorporate perspectives that may dislocate the reader given the "fact that academic authors in countries other than the English-speaking Anglo-American regions write differently to express their ideas" (p. vii). This is a significant gesture, since Japanese philosophy has from its very beginnings been wracked by the problem of translation and counter-translation. It is an act of courage for the book to acknowledge that there are different "forms of expression" that, even if they may confuse the Anglo-American reader, serve to broaden the reader's philosophical sensibility (p. xiii–xiv).Third, rather than each chapter limiting itself to expounding Nishida's thought in a general way, each in turn problematizes specific aspects of the philosopher's work, connecting it with other authors and problems.As the editors explain, the book has a bipartite structure. In the first part, several contributors explore "seven principal concepts" that are intended to reflect Nishida's perception of his own system, while in the second part, contributors investigate the place of Nishida's thought in the global history of philosophy, drawing connections between Nishida's thought and other fields such as religion, science, and art. In addition, the relevance of his thought to both the present and the future is discussed. The book includes an appendix with a chronology of Nishida's life and work and also a glossary of fundamental concepts.In Chapter 1, Nakajima Yuta explores the concept of "pure experience," highlighting its importance in Nishida's later philosophy and its relation to the self-developing structure of consciousness. In particular, Nakajima analyzes the influence of Wilhelm Wundt's Outlines of Psychology in the work An Inquiry into [End Page 1] the Good. In that sense, this article provides the historical context in which Nishida developed his ideas in contrast to the psychologist. As the author points out: "The main point of criticism is that Nishida regards the foundational elements in Wundtian psychology as mere virtual abstractions of the primordial systematic unity of experience" (p. 7). This last statement leads to the recognition that any linguistic limitation of this primordial unity becomes an abstraction, since pure experience is the framework of the meaningful, where all meanings are dynamically generated and superimposed (p. 10).Itabashi Yūjin, in Chapter 2, establishes the transition from pure experience to "absolute free will" in the work, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness, by comparing Nishida's text with the philosophies of Cohen and Schopenhauer. To understand this transition, we must not lose sight, as the author says, that when the self reflects itself in itself, it is self-producing and self-determining. This self-determination is not purely intellectual, but a total activity in which "thinking and sensation are one" (p. 20). Thus, the will is absolute because there is nothing prior to the self-productive activity of the will. For this reason, it is precisely in religious experience that "authentic life" (p. 22) emerges from the negation of the subjective self, that is, from the fiction of a foundation of absolute will.The person responsible for presenting the concept of "self-awareness" is Okada Katsuaki. In Chapter 3, Okada takes as a starting point the "subjectless" (p. 28) character of the Japanese language in order to explain the paradoxical possibility of experience experiencing itself. (p. 30). The self-awareness of the activity of the previous chapters becomes... (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda lo que se considera que son algunas de las deficiencias de la teoría contemporánea de la sociedad civil. Para ello pasa brevemente revista a la evolución histórica del concepto, y se presenta una selección de sus definiciones contemporáneas. Todas ellas manifiestan una cierta imposibilidad para contemplar la política si no es desde una polarización dualista Estado-Sociedad, que trata de superarse abriéndose el concepto de sociedad civil a una mayor interrelación entre estos dos polos. Asimismo, se afirma (...) que el recurso a la «sociedad civil» sirve para recomponer en el ámbito de la teoría y resolver de un solo golpe dos de las grandes deficiencias que asolan a las relaciones entre sistema político y sociedad: la ausencia de un sujeto unitario claramente delimitado y el déficit de integración normativa. (shrink)

Com o Sensualismo criam-se condições para uma nova estética, sensível e sensacionalista, que vai transformar as diversas artes (Literatura, Pintura, Escultura) e trazer consigo novas formas de espectáculo: o panorama, a fantasmagoria e o diorama (este, já no início do século XIX). O Eidophusikon, dispositivo de criação e ampliação (sensurround) de novas imagens – um híbrido de teatro e pintura, criado por Philippe de Loutherbourg entre 1781 e 1782 –, insere-se nesse processo e, com a fantasmagoria de Robertson (no final (...) do século XVIII, em França), constitui uma das modalidades do que hoje designamos por pré-cinema. No entanto, apropriando-se das novas condições de representação e de percepção do teatro introduzidas por David Garrick em Drury Lane – que promovem a “absorção” do espectador naquilo que vê em palco –, o Eidophusikon de Loutherbourg (ele próprio, pintor) pode ser considerado um elo em processo da nova concepção de pintura de Diderot – da qual a “promenade Vernet” do Salon de 1767 constitui como que a actualização por escrito. (shrink)

The mental limit may be described as formal fullness of time in accordance with its conditional character in relation with intelligible essence. The metaphysic knowledge includes a methodic exclusion confining time under thematic position in order to its abandonment. The abandonment of formal fullness of time notices being. As a conditional antecedent of thought object, the limit is behind practical action and it is trespassed in it.

This paper studies time in Hegel’s thought according to the interpretation of the topic in Polo’s philosophy. Two senses of the Hegelian time are distinguished as well as it is explained the dialectic development from one to the other. The first sense is tiem understood as the empty form of become, and the second one is the time of the spirit, the pure negative variation which may be designated in modal terms as whole possibility.

L. Polo's doctrine of the first principles is analized focussing the study on causality as an indicator of the trascendentality of being and of its real distinction regarding essence. The concept of totality has its origins in the nonrealization of trascendental value of causality.

El sistema neuronal, máquinas triviales y no triviales - La empresa como tejido conversacional - Conversaciones que transforman el mundo - Conversaciones responsables - Tejiendo la red - Conversaciones que completan la conversación - Reabriendo conversaciones.

La oposición a Hegel mediante la cual con frecuencia la tradición presenta la filosofía schopenhaueriana se ha interpretado en ocasiones como una relación de dependencia, en la medida en que aquella habría surgido como una cierta reacción frente a la de Hegel. El artículo muestra que los documentos disponibles acerca de los comienzos de la relación de Schopenhauer con Hegel hacen insostenible tal supuesto, además de ofrecer un marco y diversas claves para comprender su posterior polémica con el hegelianismo.

The name of the Genevan critic Jean Starobinski will most likely evoke masterful\nreadings of Rousseau and Montaigne, or insightful reconstructions of the world\nof the Enlightenment. With the possible exception of the history of melancholy,\nmuch more rarely will it be associated with the history of psychology and\npsychiatry. A small number of the critic’s contributions to this field have\nappeared in some of his books. Most of them, however, remain scattered, and\nnothing suggests that they are known as widely as they deserve.\nStarobinski’s work in (...) the history of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis\nis exemplary in its perspective of the problematic relations between\npsychological concepts and experiences, and between medical thought and the\nlarger culture. (shrink)

We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to (...) account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes. (shrink)

The notion of naivety is a form of classification and explanation of the social world. By applying Erving Goffman’s expression games model, it is observed that the notion of naivety corresponds to a situation in which an observer assumes that the observed subject does not accommodate his behavior to the presence of the observer, in the assumption that the latter might take advantage from what he learns from it. This article explores this model’s explanatory power in reference to the diverse (...) forms in which the notion of naivety is used in contexts where transinteractive structures of the art world have to be taken into account. La noción de ingenuidad es una forma cotidiana de clasificación y explicación del mundo social. Usando el modelo de juegos de expresión de Erving Goffman, se observa que ella corresponde a la situación en que un actor asume que otro no modifica su comportamiento teniendo en cuenta lo que el primero aprende de él para alcanzar sus propios objetivos. En este artículo se explora la utilidad de este modelo para explicar el uso de la noción de ingenuidad en referencia a estructuras transinteractivas de mundos del arte. (shrink)

From the classic Frankenstein of 1931 to Matrix, which offers a version of the philosophical fable of the brain in a vat and on to Self/less, in which the consciousness of a dying tycoon is transferred to a younger man’s body, cinema has variously explored the relationship between personhood and the body by means of fictions concerning the brain and its contents.1 From the crude disembodied brains of 1950s B-movies to the neuroimaging visuals of 21st-century cyberpunk, these films localize individuality (...) essentially in the brain, and make personal identity transcend the body’s demise by transplanting the brain into other, typically younger or at least healthier bodies.... (shrink)